Soviet interests drew China into Korean War Editor's Note: June 25 is the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War(1950-53). In a dialogue published Thursday, Professor Shen Zhihua (Shen) analyzed the reasons why the Soviet Union planned the war and why the US responded so quickly. But how was China drawn in to aid North Korea? What was rappelz rupees, the Soviet reaction? Global Times (GT) reporter Li Yanjie interviewed Shen, director of the Shanghai-based Center for Cold War International History Studies and a professor of history at East China Normal University. He is the author of Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War rappelz rupees and many other works on the Korean War. This is the second part of a two-part series. GT: Why didn't the Soviet representative to the UN veto the UN intervention to help South Korea, since the Soviet Union had planned the war? Shen: The Soviet Union announced a temporary withdrawal from the UN to support the PRC before the Korean War, because the UN only recognized the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan. Surely the Soviet Union could have attended the UN conference and expressed its opinion on the Korean War, but it didn't. The reasons are still a puzzle. A telegram from Stalin to Klement Gottwald, the then-Czechoslovakia's Communist Party leader, revealed by a Russian scholar several years ago, showed replica rolex, that the Soviet Union intentionally didn't attend the conference. Stalin said that in this way, the US decision was illegal with the absence of two big powers (the Soviet Union and the PRC), and the US would make its real intentions clear on the Korean issue and make more silly mistakes. This telegram implies that Stalin had predicted that replica rolex the US would enter the war and thus created the conditions for the US to get involved and trapped in the Far East. As a result, US forces in Europe would be weakened and World War III would be postponed. But I don't agree with this interpretation. The Soviet Union withdrew from the UN on January 13, 1950, yet it wasn't until the end of January that it approved Kim Il-sung's plan. And the withdrawal was made after discussion with China. This contradicted Stalin's telegram maple story power leveling, meaning to let the US in, and then China would be in. Besides, Stalin agreed to Kim's plan only maple story power leveling under the premise that the US wouldn't intervene, which also proves that Stalin didn't hope the US would enter the war. In addition, after the war broke out, the Soviet Union was slow to openly react, which shows they were caught off-guard by events. It wasn't appropriate to veto the UN's decision, signaling their support of North Korea, or to agree, which would have been seen as treachery by North Korea. GT: Stalin didn't ask China enter into the war immediately. Why? Shen: After the outbreak of the Korean War, to Stalin and Kim's surprise, the US immediately declared that it would intervene and became the first to throw air and naval forces into the battle. The US entry quickly resulted in enormous losses to the North Korean military, especially in ships and planes. According to a report by the Soviet Army General Staff headquarters, by July 3, 1950, 36 North Korean aircraft and five naval vessels had been attacked and destroyed. At this point, Stalin realized that the war was not going to go smoothly. He needed to think over the question of how to increase support to North Korea, while making sure that such support would not come directly from Moscow. In fact, the Soviet counselors designed all the battle plans, as the North Korea's People's Army was inexperi-enced. But Stalin absolutely forbade Soviet soldiers from crossing the 38th parallel or directly participating in battle. He remarked, "We do not want to leave evidence that replica rolex, could be used to accuse us of involvement in this." What Stalin had in mind was that the Chinese army could provide assistance replica rolex when necessary. Of course, when and how that assistance would be provided would depend on the development of the war situation. Chinese leaders had paid close attention to the war, especially after the US began to intervene. China requested updates on the war situation and suggested Kim attack and occupy southern harbors and station strong defense forces at places like Inchon. On July 5, Stalin wired, "We think it is correct to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the China-Korea border so that the volunteers can enter North Korea for battle when the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try our best to provide air cover." In order to urge the Chinese to make the decision and prepare to dispatch troops to Korea as soon as possible, Stalin, in the two telegrams followed, clearly promised that the Soviet Union would also provide air cover for Chinese troops that "entered North Korea for combat," as well as assisting the Chinese in training their air force and providing the Chinese with air force equipment. What should be noted here, however, is that Stalin established a precondition, that is, the timing would be "when the enemy crosses the 38th parallel." Mao told both Stalin and Kim that China could help in garrisoning coastal areas and important ports. But Kim at first believed that the US wouldn't intervene, so he didn't accept China's offer, and later without Moscow's permission, Kim dared not ask China to send troops to Korea even when urgently needed. Moscow told the Koreans not to lose confidence on temporary failures and to fight on their own. In an August 28 telegram, Stalin told Kim, "The Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union has no doubt at all that the foreign interventionists will be driven out of Korea soon." Finally, Stalin promised Kim that "If necessary, we can provide Korea with attack planes and fighter planes again." But the fact is that Stalin didn't provide air support to North Korea in a timely manner, and halted the already-decided provision of air cover for Chinese troops. It appeared that Moscow did not want Chinese armies to enter the war until such a time as the situation became critical. The eagerness Mao showed to send troops to Korea most likely aroused Stalin's suspicions, since one consequence of China sending troops would be to expand her status and influence in Korea. From a long-term point of view, this would not be to the Soviets' advantage. GT: How did China enter into the war? Shen: After the US landed in Inchon on September 15, 1950, North Korea's situation became increasingly desperate. Kim asked Stalin immediately if North Korea should ask for China's aid. But Stalin replied on September 24 that North Korea should preserve and depend on itself. China also signaled to the Soviet Union that the situation in the Korean Peninsula was critical that China and the Soviet Union should send military aid there, but Stalin didn't respond to China's request. On September 30, Moscow received a report from its ambassador to North Korea, Terenty Shtykov, that Seoul was probably already lost and the road for , the main force of the North Korea's People's Army to retreat had been cut and communication had been cut off. That same night, Kim sent a letter seeking help, earnestly requesting that Stalin provide "direct military assistance," and if that was not workable, to please "help form international volunteer armies in China and other people's democratic countries." Facing this emergency, Stalin finally gave the green light to the Chinese armies. GT: The Soviets and China once thought of giving up North Korea. Why? Shen: On October 1, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao, asking Chinese troops to enter Korea for the war as volunteers, organizing defenses in the areas north of the 38th Parallel. Stalin also rather disingenuously stated "I have not mentioned this to the Korean comrades and do not intend to mention it. But Atlantica gold I have no doubt that they will be very happy after they hear this." Due to vigorous advocacy by Mao and General Peng Dehuai, China finally adopted a resolution to send troops into battle in Korea. Soon afterward, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was formally established and the army en-tered the final prewar preparation stage. On October 8, Mao informed Kim and Stalin that China had decided to form a volunteer army to assist North Korea, and the troops would start entering Korea around October 15. However, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai went to the Soviet Union to confirm the weapons, equipment and air support it promised to provide, Stalin pointed out that he could still completely meet all China's needs for military equipment like airplanes, tanks and artillery, but the Soviet air force was not yet ready and could not go into action for two to two-and-a-half months. After extended discussions, both sides agreed that since both could only be ready after six months when North Korea would have been occupied by South Korea and the US, they had to give up the country and inform Kim to arrange a retreat as soon as possible. Stalin required Mao to make the final decision, so that China would have been blamed if North Korea had been lost in the end. But actually, the Soviet Union's military force was already prepared for war. Stalin always forbade Soviet forces from directly engaging with US forces at the frontline, even when they pro-vided air cover in the rear areas. He was skeptical about the determination of the Chinese to intervene and the prospects for victory even if they did. Finally, Stalin still had hopes of solving the Korean issue peacefully through secret diplomatic channels. But the secret diplomacy failed. Mao first agreed, but later changed his mind and insisted on sending troops to Korea, as this action carries greater significance politically rather than militarily. He believed that if the US occupied the whole of Korea, China's security would be endangered. When China engaged with US troops in Korea, Stalin finally trusted China and offered air force support. The result was that the war enhanced Sino-Soviet relations and formed a real alliance between the two countries.